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OFFICER DISCRETION AND THE CHOICE TO
RECORD: OFFICER ATTITUDES TOWARDS
BODY-WORN CAMERA ACTIVATION*
BRYCE CLAYTON NEWELL** & RUBEN GREIDANUS***
In recent years, questions about when police officers should
activate (or not activate) their body-worn cameras during policepublic encounters have risen into the foreground of public and
scholarly debate. Understanding how officers perceive bodyworn cameras and policies surrounding activation (and how they
view these as impacting their ability to make discretionary
choices while on the job) can provide greater insight into why,
when, and how officers may attempt to exercise their discretion in
the form of resistance or avoidance to body cameras, seen as
technologies of accountability. In this Article, we examine officer
attitudes about how much discretion they ought to have about
when (or when not) to activate their cameras, what concerns they
have about overbroad, overly punitive, or ambiguous activation
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policies, and their perceptions about how frequently cameras
ought to be activated in specific circumstances (i.e., general
police-public interactions, arrest situations, domestic violence
calls, traffic stops, when taking statements from witnesses or
victims, and when responding to calls inside homes and medical
facilities). These findings are drawn from a multi-year and
mixed-methods study of police officer adoption of body-worn
cameras in two municipal police departments in the Pacific
Northwest region of the United States from 2014 to 2018.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, questions about when police officers
should activate (or not activate) their body-worn cameras (“BWCs”)
when contacting or otherwise interacting with a member of the public
have risen into the foreground of public and scholarly debate.
Instances in which camera-wearing officers have failed to activate
1
their cameras have also received significant media scrutiny.
1. See, e.g., Jared Goyette, Australian Justine Damond Shot Dead by US Police in
Minneapolis, THE GUARDIAN (July 16, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/jul/17/australian-woman-justine-damond-shot-dead-by-us-police-in-minneapolis
[https://perma.cc/5XRS-79BG]; Eric Levenson, Minneapolis Police Shooting Exposes
Flaws of Body Cameras, CNN (July 19, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/19/us
/minneapolis-police-shooting-body-camera/index.html
[https://perma.cc/F5UK-NPZV];
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Departmental policies in police agencies around the country (and
beyond) that ostensibly regulate officer behavior in this context are
2
varied, although emerging evidence suggests (predictably) that
agency-level activation policies can impact officer activation rates in
some circumstances (as can other factors, such as the presence of
other officers and bystanders or whether camera use is mandated or
3
voluntary). Concerns that civil society groups, the press, and
members of the public have regarding activation policies and
activation practices are often linked to normative ideas about police
accountability and transparency, the appropriateness and limits of
officer discretion, and, in some cases, the adverse impact that
4
increased recording may have on privacy interests.

Editorial, Officers, Turn on Your Body Cameras, WASH. POST (July 22, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/officers-turn-on-your-body-cameras/2017/07/22
/41290ff0-6e3e-11e7-b9e2-2056e768a7e5_story.html?utm_term=.67385a2d0d90 [https://perma.cc
/MW4F-ZA54]; Brandt Williams, Minneapolis Officers Failed to Turn on Body Cameras
Before Fatal Shooting, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 18, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/07/18
/537861230/minneapolis-officers-failed-to-turn-on-body-cameras-before-fatal-shooting
[https://perma.cc/L36T-FQ2L].
2. See Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, and Police Body Cameras: The
National Policy Split, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395, 422–23 (2016); POLICE BODY WORN
CAMERAS: A POLICY SCORECARD, THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE & UPTURN (2017),
https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static/pdfs/LCCHR%20and%20Upturn%20-%20BWC
%20Scorecard%20v.3.04.pdf [https://perma.cc/KL5T-H4W8].
3. See, e.g., Jacob T.N. Young & Justin T. Ready, A Longitudinal Analysis of the
Relationship Between Administrative Policy, Technological Preferences, and Body-Worn
Camera Activation Among Police Officers, 12 POLICING: J. POL’Y & PRACTICE 27, 36–39
(2018) (finding that camera activation rates declined under a discretionary use policy,
especially by officers who had not volunteered to wear the cameras; but also finding that
camera activation rates decreased when victims were present); Allyson Roy, On-Officer
Video Cameras: Examining the Effects of Police Department Policy and Assignment on
Camera Use and Activation 33–34 (May 2014) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Arizona State
University) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (finding that department policy;
the presence of bystanders, witnesses, or supervisors; and voluntary versus mandatory use
affected camera activation rates).
4. See Fan, supra note 2, at 422–23; Alexandra Mateescu, Alex Rosenblat & danah
boyd, Dreams of Accountability, Guaranteed Surveillance: The Promises and Costs of
Body-Worn Cameras, 14 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 122, 122 (2016) (noting that “balancing
the right of public access with the need to protect against this technology’s invasive
aspects” is important because “body-worn cameras present definite and identifiable risks
to privacy”); Bryce Clayton Newell, Collateral Visibility: A Socio-Legal Study of Police
Body-Camera Adoption, Privacy, and Public Disclosure in Washington State, 92 IND. L.J.
1329, 1341 (2017) (discussing how public disclosure of body-worn camera video under
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In the end, questions about appropriate activation policies and
practices are all about power, accountability, and information politics.
They cannot always be easily separated from related questions about
information access and control, meaning that the appropriateness of
any particular activation policy may depend in large part on the local
social, political, and legal context in which the cameras are being
deployed.
These issues are hotly contested and often difficult to research.
However, the implications of these policy decisions may have
significant impacts on how BWCs are used by officers and what (and
how much) visual evidence is collected, as well as on other aspects of
officer behavior, such as on the frequency of officers engaging in uses
5
6
of force or stop-and-frisks. Research suggests that strict
7
(mandatory) activation policies may increase activation rates, while
some studies have also found that compliance with activation policies
8
has declined over time in certain police agencies. A growing body of
literature also examines officer attitudes towards BWCs, and multiple
studies engage Orlikowski and Gash’s concept of “technological
9
frames” to understand how officers’ perceptions and interpretations

state access to information laws may negatively impact the privacy interests of members of
the public).
5. Barak Ariel et al., Report: Increases in Police Use of Force in the Presence of
Body-Worn Cameras Are Driven by Officer Discretion: A Protocol-Based Subgroup
Analysis of Ten Randomized Experiments, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 453, 459
(2016).
6. Justin T. Ready & Jacob T.N. Young, The Impact of On-Officer Video Cameras
on Police–Citizen Contacts: Findings From a Controlled Experiment in Mesa, AZ, 11 J.
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 445, 445 (2015).
7. Roy, supra note 3, at 33, 40.
8. CHARLES M. KATZ ET AL., ARIZ. STATE UNIV. CTR. FOR VIOLENCE
PREVENTION & CMTY. SAFETY, EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF OFFICER WORN BODY
CAMERAS
IN
THE
PHOENIX
POLICE
DEPARTMENT
7,
21
(2014)
https://publicservice.asu.edu/sites/default/files/ppd_spi_feb_20_2015_final.pdf [https://perma.cc
/777Y-GWYG].
9. Wanda J. Orlikowski & Debra C. Gash, Technological Frames: Making Sense of
Information Technology in Organizations, 12 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. SYS. 174,
178 (1994) (“We use the term technological frame to identify that subset of members’
organizational frames that concern the assumptions, expectations, and knowledge they use
to understand technology in organizations. This includes not only the nature and role of
the technology itself, but the specific conditions, applications, and consequences of that
technology in particular contexts.”).

96 N.C. L. REV. 1525 (2018)

2018]

THE CHOICE TO RECORD

1529
10

of the technology may impact how they use it. The concept of
technological frames aims to capture how individuals or groups
perceive and understand a technology, including the assumptions they
have about how the technology functions, how useful the technology
might be, and what sort of concerns they might have about learning to
11
use it. In the context of BWC deployment, these frames of reference
should be seen as changing over time, as officers’ experiences with
cameras evolve, and not as fixed at a single point of reference (for
12
example, at the moment of adoption). Thus, understanding how
officers perceive BWCs and policies surrounding activation (and how
these perceptions may change over time), how they view the cameras
as impacting their ability to make discretionary choices while on the
job, and the reasons they have concerns about the use of BWCs, can
provide greater insight into why, when, and how officers may attempt
13
to exercise their discretion in the form of resistance or avoidance.
This Article examines officer attitudes regarding the amount of
discretion they think they ought to have in deciding when (or when
not) to activate their cameras, as well as their perceptions about how
frequently cameras ought to be activated in specific circumstances.
These findings are drawn from a multi-year and mixed-methods study
of police officer adoption of BWCs in two municipal police
departments in the Pacific Northwest region of the United States
from September 2014 to January 2018. The research draws on
responses from sworn police officers in these departments during
ride-alongs (informal interviews) and to both qualitative and
quantitative responses to questions on a series of questionnaires.

10. Marthinus Christoffel Koen, On-Set with Body-Worn Cameras in a Police
Organization: Structures, Practices, and Technological Frames 5–8 (2016) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, George Mason Univ.) (on file at George Mason Univ.); Roy, supra note 3, at
12–13.
11. See Orlikowski & Gash, supra note 9, at 178–79.
12. Roy, supra note 3, at 13 (describing how officers’ initial reluctance to new
technology may change with time).
13. For a discussion of various forms of resistance, avoidance, and neutralization, see
Gary T. Marx, A Tack in the Shoe: Neutralizing and Resisting the New Surveillance, 59 J.
SOC. ISSUES 369, 372–84 (2003); Gary T. Marx, A Tack in the Shoe and Taking Off the
Shoe: Neutralization and Counter-neutralization Dynamics, 6 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y
294, 294–97 (2009).
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In addition, this Article seeks to answer the following research
questions (at least insofar as they pertain to the two agencies included
in our study): What discretion do officers feel they should have
regarding when their BWCs should (or should not) be activated?
How frequently do officers feel that BWCs should generally be
activated in various contexts (i.e., in all police-citizen interactions,
arrest situations, traffic stops, inside homes, inside medical facilities,
during domestic violence calls for service, or while taking witness or
victim statements)? How frequently do officers who have used
cameras report activating their cameras in each of these same
situations?
Of course, the policy options available here are not merely
binary: there may be contexts where recording should be mandated or
prohibited but, in many cases, it may also be appropriate to permit
the officers to record in circumstances where recording is not
mandatory or to make the choice not to record in circumstances
14
where recording has not been prohibited. Importantly, officers have
long been making these sorts of (discretionary) decisions (e.g., to
document something they observe or hear) in many aspects of their
work. The sophisticated understanding that many officers have of the
law that regulates their ability to stop, search, or use force (at least on
a practical level) has yet to be replicated with regard to the
appropriateness and proportionality of recording across a variety of
police-public interactions. Several scholars have made normative
arguments about what legal consequences should follow a failure to
record, particularly when the failure to record was in violation of
15
mandatory activation policies.
Our reliance on primarily self-reported attitudinal data in this
study means, of course, that many of our findings are not conclusions
about what happened (e.g., actual compliance rates) within each of
14. See Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1363, 1416
(2018) (“An agency policy that sets out clear standards for mandatory, permitted, and
prohibited recording is a necessary component of a robust body-worn camera policy.”).
15. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video Devices (Head Cams)
as Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV.
357, 365 (2010) (arguing for a “presumption that the defendant’s version of events should
be accepted, absent (1) a compelling reason explaining the failure to record, and (2) a
finding that the defendant’s version of events could not be believed by a reasonable
person”).
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these departments, but rather are reflections on how officers
conceptualize, internalize, and frame their use of the cameras—at
least insofar as they are willing to disclose this to third-party
researchers. Collecting and analyzing attitudinal data over time is
useful in this context, because, along with the qualitative insights
gleamed during ride-alongs, it allows us to better understand the
technological frames that officers have of the cameras (and how these
may change over time), how organizational considerations shape
technology use by officers, and ways in which officers might wish to
16
resist compliance or use the technology in unexpected ways.
Manning has argued that “[s]ignificant differences in response to
and use of . . . technology [by police officers] are . . . best understood
as consistent with the impressions members of the organization wish
17
to convey to particular audiences.” If this is the case, it suggests that
the information politics of the police have been impacted by the
deployment of BWCs within these agencies. Because transparency
and accountability (including access to BWC video) have become
dominant themes surrounding the adoption of cameras across the
United States, the potential visibility that camera activation implies
for individual officers may impact how often, and when, cameras are
activated—by regulating officers’ individual choices about whether to
record, in accordance or not with departmental policy, or by
influencing the development of departmental policy itself.
The Article proceeds as follows: First, we discuss relevant
existing scholarship from both the legal and criminological literature
and provide additional background and context for our study. Second,
we describe our research methods and outline the demographic
characteristics of our respondents and the agencies in which they
work. Third, we present both qualitative and quantitative findings
relevant to the research questions presented above. Finally, we
conclude the paper by drawing connections between our findings and
the existing literature, discussing implications of various policy
choices on privacy, officer resistance, and evidentiary presumptions,
and present the argument that activation policies need to be drafted
16. See Peter K. Manning, Information Technology in the Police Context: The “Sailor”
Phone, 7 INFO. SYS. RES. 52, 52 (1996).
17. Id.
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to provide officers clear and practical guidance and to incentivize
activation in appropriate circumstances while allowing for some forms
of discretion, particularly in situations that implicate the legitimate
privacy-related concerns of bystanders, victims, witnesses, informants,
and suspects. Importantly, we note that questions of public access to
footage may also need to be addressed to properly incentivize
recording in some circumstances where the potential for wide public
visibility may push against officers’ willingness to record due to
privacy (or other) concerns.
I. BACKGROUND
Camera activation policies and the degree of officer discretion
afforded to individual officers are key to realizing some envisioned
benefits of BWCs. Recent studies have found contradictory results
about whether BWC implementation leads to reduced levels of use of
force and complaints against officers within an agency, but the
evidence suggests that officer discretion may be a key variable. In the
first randomized controlled trial of BWCs in the United States,
researchers reported that the cameras had a significant impact on the
frequency with which officers used force as well as the number of
18
citizen complaints against officers. However, in a subsequent
replication study across multiple police departments, the researchers
found that, on average across sites, camera adoption had no
19
significant effect on use of force rates. Interestingly, though, the
results of the multi-site study showed that officers who complied with
the experimental conditions by not exercising discretion and always
activating their cameras engaged in less use of force than officers in
18. Barak Ariel, William Farrar & Alex Sutherland, The Effect of Police Body-Worn
Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police: A Randomized
Controlled Trial, 31 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 509, 523–24 (2015).
19. Barak Ariel et al., Wearing Body Cameras Increases Assaults Against Officers and
Does Not Reduce Police Use of Force: Results from a Global Multi-Site Experiment, 13
EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 744, 745 (2016); Ariel et al., supra note 5, at 459–60 (2016). Other
randomized controlled trial-based studies have also found that cameras have little or no
statistically significant effect on use of force rates. See David Yokum, Anita Ravishankar
& Alexander Coppock, Evaluating the Effects of Police Body-Worn Cameras: A
Randomized Controlled Trial 11 (Lab @ D.C., Working Paper, Oct. 20, 2017)
http://bwc.thelab.dc.gov/TheLabDC_MPD_BWC_Working_Paper_10.20.17.pdf [https://perma.cc
/T99F-45S4].
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the control group, while those who exercised discretion engaged in
20
use of force much more frequently.
Drawing from deterrence theory, the authors proposed the
“deterrence spectrum,” ranging from weak deterrence (lax activation
policies, lack of consequences for violations) to strong deterrence
21
(mandatory activation policies, high likelihood of consequences).
Accordingly, they concluded that, “[t]he deterrence spectrum is
closely linked to activation policies, and specifically to discretion: the
more officers can opt-out from mandatory activation procedures (and
without consequences for deactivations), the less we should expect
22
the BWCs to effect policing.” These findings led the researchers to
conclude that “cameras should remain on throughout the entire
shift—that is, during each and every interaction with citizens—and
23
should be prefaced by a verbal reminder that the camera is present.”
This suggestion also tracks a recommendation by the American Civil
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) that officers should activate cameras
24
prior to any interaction with the public. While the ACLU
recommendation allows for some minor discretion, it simultaneously
emphasizes that activation policies which allow for officer discretion
can only be effective if (enforceable) consequences exist for failure to
25
adhere to the departments’ activation policies.
One technological fix in this situation could be automated
26
activation in various circumstances, something that many bodycamera manufacturers have already been developing and
27
incorporating into their technologies. This technical solution could
20. Ariel et al., supra note 5, at 459.
21. Barak Ariel et al., The Deterrence Spectrum: Explaining Why Police Body-Worn
Cameras ‘Work’ or ‘Backfire’ in Aggressive Police–Public Encounters, 12 POLICING: J.
POL’Y & PRACTICE 6, 14–16 (2018).
22. Id. at 22.
23. Ariel et al., supra note 5, at 461.
24. JAY STANLEY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, POLICE BODY-MOUNTED
CAMERAS: WITH RIGHT POLICIES IN PLACE, A WIN FOR ALL (VERSION 2.0) 4–5 (2015),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/police_body-mounted_cameras-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc
/77Q5-X6PJ].
25. Id.
26. See Ariel et al., supra note 21, at 20–21.
27. Activation could be triggered by, amongst other things, holster activity, opening
the car door, or activating the police sirens. See, e.g., Sebastian Anthony, New Holster
Forces All Nearby Body Cams to Start Recording When Gun is Pulled, ARS TECHNICA,
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simultaneously provide less discretion regarding when to record while
also freeing the officer to deal with the situation at hand, and it would
also lessen the possibility that activation during an already tense
interaction may be seen “as a confrontational reaction made by the
officer,” thus escalating the tension in the situation and making it
28
more likely that force may be used (or necessary).
A report from the U.S. Department of Justice, based on its
investigation of the Albuquerque (New Mexico) Police Department,
described several incidents where officers failed to activate their
29
BWCs in use of force contexts. In some of these incidents, the
officers initiated the contact, making the failure to activate “especially
30
troubling.”
The report notes “repetitive or standardized
explanations for failing to record,” such as “the immediacy of the
situation,” despite officers having sufficient opportunity to activate
31
the camera. In the end, only a small number of officers were
32
disciplined for their failure to comply. Additionally, Denver’s Office
of the Independent Monitor found that fewer than half of the use of
force incidents (that occurred in one of the Denver Police
Department’s patrol districts during the department’s pilot project)
with a BWC present were actually recorded by the officers wearing
33
the cameras.
A more fundamental issue concerns the fact that some
34
departments simply do not have any written policy at all. As such, it
(Feb. 28, 2017 8:46 AM), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2017/02/axon-signal-sidearmautomatic-body-cam [https://perma.cc/GP9H-TN2X].
28. Ariel et al., supra note 21, at 20.
29. Letter from Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div.,
& Damon P. Martinez, Acting U.S. Attorney, Dist. of N.M., to Richard J. Berry, Mayor,
City of Albuquerque, N.M. 25–26 (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default
/files/crt/legacy/2014/04/10/apd_findings_4-10-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MT6-EWVJ].
30. Id. at 26.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. NICHOLAS E. MITCHELL, DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, 2014
ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2015) https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals
/374/documents/2014_Annual_Report%20Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PX5Y-4VHL]
(“[J]ust less than half (47%) of those use of force incidents were actually captured by
BWCs. The remainder were not recorded either because the BWCs weren’t activated, or
they weren’t used in a way that produced useable and complete footage.”).
34. See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN
CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 2 (2014),
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is no surprise that the ACLU emphasizes the need for clear policies
35
that also “have some teeth.” Aside from the possibility of direct
disciplinary action against individual officers, the ACLU goes several
steps further and proposes the “adoption of rebuttable evidentiary
presumptions in favor of criminal defendants who claim exculpatory
evidence was not captured or was destroyed” and even evidentiary
36
presumptions on behalf of civil plaintiffs suing for damages.
Although courts have traditionally applied such evidentiary
37
presumptions in cases where evidence was destroyed, it is possible
that courts may also apply evidentiary presumptions in cases where
38
footage is absent altogether.
The position that cameras should always be on or that all
39
encounters should be recorded has garnered criticism. Arguments
against such policy include negative impact on community
relationships and the fact that it signifies a lack of trust in local
40
officers. As the President of the Association of Chief Police Officers
in the United Kingdom puts it, “[l]egitimacy in policing is built on
trust. And the notion of video-recording every interaction in a very
tense situation would simply not be a practical operational way of
delivering policing. In fact, it would exacerbate all sorts of
41
problems.” Practically speaking, always-on on policies also lead to a
massive amount of video footage that must be processed and stored.
Privacy concerns are also frequently cited as a strong argument
against always-on policies and in favor of officer discretion. Privacy
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Technology/implementing
%20a%20body-worn%20camera%20program.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KT6-8F8H]; Kelly
Freund, Note, When Cameras Are Rolling: Privacy Implications of Body-Mounted
Cameras on Police, 49 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 91, 109 (2015).
35. STANLEY, supra note 24, at 4–5.
36. Id.; see also, Harris, supra note 15, at 365 (proposing a presumption in favor of the
claimant’s testimony of officer misconduct when an officer fails to record).
37. See, e.g., Wong v. Swier, 267 F.2d 749, 759 (9th Cir. 1959) (stating that “when
there is tampering with evidence, a presumption against the parties who are responsible
arises.”).
38. MARC JONATHAN BLITZ, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY,
POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS: EVIDENTIARY BENEFITS AND PRIVACY THREATS 11–
12 (2015) https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Blitz_-_On-Body_Cameras_-_Issue
_Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/SCZ3-PCJ9].
39. See, e.g., Freund, supra note 34, at 119.
40. See, e.g., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 34, at 13–14.
41. Id. at 14.
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interests might be raised by a witness, victim, or suspect—for
example, through an affirmative request that the officer cease
recording—but they may also be raised by the recording officer,
based on concerns that recording a certain conversation or interaction
might violate the privacy of the officer or of those with whom the
officer is interacting, especially when public records laws provide for
liberal public disclosure of such video without clear privacy-related
42
exemptions.
Aside from privacy issues arising from police presence in private
spaces, it has also been suggested that BWCs may implicate Fourth
43
Amendment rights. According to Blitz, however, this is unlikely
because BWCs are unlikely to generate footage that allows for a
comprehensive picture of someone’s life (at least without a massive
effort by government), and are, instead, predominantly used as a tool
44
to monitor officers. Nielsen comes to the same conclusion, and
draws a parallel between BWCs and the prevailing view concerning
pole cameras, which are thought to be incapable of recording
anything covered under the reasonable expectation of privacy
45
doctrine under regular conditions. Although the fate of the mosaic
46
the
theory of the Fourth Amendment is still undecided,
incorporation of newer or more advanced capabilities, such as facial
recognition, artificial intelligence, or increased field-of-view/zooming
abilities into BWC systems would seem to make this sort of analysis
47
more relevant in the body-camera context. Where the use of
42. See Newell, supra note 4, at 1384–85 (noting in response to BWCs, officers have
expressed “[p]rivacy concerns in connection to liberal public disclosure rules”).
43. See BLITZ, supra note 38, at 13 (discussing BWCs and the Fourth Amendment
and observing “[s]ome critics of body-worn cameras have warned that by routinely
recording the activities of citizens that unfold in front of a police officer, government
would be engaging in a Fourth Amendment Search”).
44. Id. at 16.
45. Erik Nielsen, Comment, Fourth Amendment Implications of Police-Worn Body
Cameras, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 115, 129–34 (2016).
46. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 400, 405–06 (2012). For a detailed
overview and discussion of the mosaic theory after Jones, see Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313–14 (2012) (explaining that
“[u]nder the mosaic theory, searches can be analyzed as a collective sequence of steps
rather than as individual steps”).
47. See Nielsen, supra note 45, at 132–33 (concluding that increased technological
capabilities of cameras could lead to Fourth Amendment violations).
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wearable police cameras (both in public and in private spaces) may
begin to implicate Fourth Amendment concerns—or even state
wiretapping and eavesdropping concerns—remains somewhat
48
unclear.
The literature recognizes that there are other ways of mitigating
privacy concerns aside from granting officers’ discretion to turn their
cameras on or off. For instance, Lin argues that even though “giving
police officers broad discretion on when to record would allow
officers to take privacy and sensitivity concerns into consideration,”
49
such discretion may also lead to selective recording. Instead, he
explores the possibility of data management techniques and data
retention policies as a solution to the privacy problem (which takes
50
place after the recording rather than prior to it). Blitz also
recognizes this possibility, but warns that ex-post strategies may not
be enough to “ease the fears of a witness unwilling to talk with a
51
camera running.” In this regard, privacy is not only an abstract
citizen interest, but may also affect how well officers are able to do
their jobs. Moreover, if cameras are left running nigh-permanently
and departments instead rely exclusively on ex-post strategies, then
52
officer privacy may also be unduly implicated. And, as we discuss
later, in states with liberal access to information policies, the fact that
a video record exists, even if only briefly, may make it subject to
public disclosure, exacerbating the privacy-related concerns of
53
civilians.
Although it is evident that policy influences officer behavior
concerning camera activation to some degree or another, policy does
not guarantee it. Indeed, it is commonly accepted that merely
introducing a certain technology to police by no means guarantees the
envisioned effect. Historically speaking, outcomes of introducing new
48. Freund, supra note 34, at 132 (“It is clear . . . that the legal limits of how cameras
can be used have not been completely established”).
49. Richard Lin, Police Body Worn Cameras and Privacy: Retaining Benefits While
Reducing Public Concerns, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 346, 359 (2016).
50. Id. at 360–61.
51. BLITZ, supra note 38, at 17.
52. See Freund, supra note 34, at 106–08, 120 (discussing privacy and safety concerns
of police officers and citing the possibility of retaliation by superiors).
53. See Fan, supra note 2, at 411–12; Mateescu et al., supra note 4, at 122; Newell,
supra note 4, at 1331, 1334, 1337.
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technologies in law enforcement have been divergent across different
police departments and different types of technologies, suggesting
that “many organizational, technological and external factors” are at
54
play. In understanding those divergent outcomes, Orlikowski and
Gash introduced the concept of technological and organizational
frames, which they define as a “subset of members’ organizational
frames that concern the assumptions, expectations, and knowledge
[that members of an organization] use to understand technology in
55
organizations.” These frames, which are not static but rather,
56
despite often being well entrenched, are capable of shifting,
consequently shape officer perceptions of new technologies.
Therefore, altering these frames when needed can be crucial to
reaching desired outcomes. When frames between groups are
incongruent, then this “can result in conflicts about the development,
use, and meaning of technologies in a police organization, as well as
57
different outcomes of technology.”
In this regard, the idea of a single, uniform “police culture” has
been contested, and it has instead been suggested that a multitude of
police cultures exist, both between different departments and
58
between different ranks of officers. Specifically, “street culture”
(which is often characterized as being concerned with “uncertainty,
59
solidarity, on-the-job experience, and distrust of superior officers”)
54. Koen, supra note 10, at 26.
55. Orlikowski & Gash, supra note 9, at 178.
56. See Wanda J. Orlikowski & Debra C. Gash, Changing Frames: Understanding
Technological Change in Organizations 4 (Mass. Inst. of Tech., Sloan Sch. of Mgmt.,
Working Paper No. 3368-92 1992), http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/46992
/changingframesun00orli.pdf [https://perma.cc/K337-FHBR] (stating frames are “expected
to vary by context and over time”).
57. Cynthia Lum, Christopher S. Koper & James Willis, Understanding the Limits of
Technology’s Impact on Police Effectiveness, 20 POLICE Q. 135, 138 (2017).
58. See Eugene A. Paoline III, Taking Stock: Toward a Richer Understanding of
Police Culture, 31 J. CRIM. JUST. 199, 207–09 (2003) (“In sum, the most recent
developments in the study of police culture point out the changes in the demographics of
occupational members and police philosophies over the past twenty-five years that may
have eroded the monolithic police culture, to the extent that one ever existed.”); Carrie B.
Sanders, Crystal Weston & Nicole Schott, Police Innovations, ‘Secret Squirrels’ and
Accountability: Empirically Studying Intelligence-Led Policing in Canada, 55 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 711, 724 (2015) (concluding “workgroups” influence culture and rejecting
“the notion of a monolithic universal police culture”).
59. Koen, supra note 10, at 138.

96 N.C. L. REV. 1525 (2018)

2018]

THE CHOICE TO RECORD

1539

plays a key role in the grander scheme of police culture, as it is here
that new officers are introduced to the job and “develop their style of
60
policing.” With BWCs being primarily employed at the patrol level,
the importance of proper implementation becomes especially
apparent as positive experiences with the technology may allow room
for officers to develop different styles of policing (in contrast to the
traditional, reactive style of policing). It is possible that BWCs, when
perceived as a symbol of distrust and tool of surveillance to be used
against officers, would reinforce feelings of uncertainty and distrust of
superior officers, ultimately discouraging more proactive policing.
After all, for new officers, adhering to the traditional style will tend to
entail less risk than proactive policing, which requires taking initiative
and treading beyond the boundaries of basic protocol and established
tradition. This would not only affect officers directly in their current
capacity as patrol officers but may also have long lasting
consequences for the entire organization as they move up (or, at least,
to different positions) within the organization.
Building on the concepts introduced by Orlikowski and Gash,
Lum et al. found that “police view technology through technological
and organizational frames determined by traditional and reactive
61
policing approaches.”
These traditional and reactive policing
approaches “dominate law enforcement practice” and create “strong
organizational and technological frames, which powerfully mediate
62
the effects of technology on discretion, efficiency and effectiveness.”
Officers place great value on technological efficiency, and new
technologies that are considered inefficient “or do not contribute to
what officers believe to be their primary tasks,” tend to be met with
63
resistance. Lum et al. perceive and note these same difficulties
64
playing out in the domain of BWCs.
BWCs implicate police discretion beyond simply questions of
activation. BWCs also allow for much greater oversight by superiors
60. Paoline, supra note 58, at 209–10.
61. Lum et al., supra note 57 at 135.
62. Id. at 155.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 157 (noting that “how police officers perceive and use body-worn cameras
may be quite different from the community’s intended objectives . . . because of the
technological frames by which they are filtered).
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(and, in case of public access to footage, society), and officers may
thus experience a lessened degree of autonomy and discretion on the
65
job. The ability to exercise discretion has been linked to job
66
satisfaction
and, due to police work’s inherent complexity,
discretion has been described as being “at the core of police
67
functioning.” A qualitative study by Koen found that BWCs
68
moderately affect officer discretion.
While noting that no
fundamental change had taken place in the way in which police
officers made their decisions, some did feel their discretion had
diminished: one-third of patrol officers responded that they used less
69
discretion. As expected, several officers explained that this was due
to the now increased possibility of being scrutinized for their
70
discretionary decisions.
The steady flow of controversies in the news reveal that the issue
of missing camera footage during critical incidents remains pervasive.
Those in favor of affording officers a high degree of discretion cite
privacy concerns and argue that effective policing is built on trust.
While some of the alleged benefits from strict activation policies and
consequences for non-compliance have indeed been disputed, there is
nevertheless a strong basis in the literature to support the claim that
these play significant roles in camera activation by officers. At the
same time, the literature also reveals that officers’ willingness to
activate the camera should be approached with an understanding of
the technological frames held by the officers within any given
organization. Many officers view BWCs as something that limits their
autonomy and runs counter to their ideas of efficiency and primary
job functions. To understand how, when, and why police officers may
refuse to comply with activation policy, a deeper comprehension of

65. See Koen, supra note 10, at 71–79 (examining how BWCs have impacted police
discretion and concluding that it has had a “moderate” impact).
66. See Richard R. Johnson, Police Officer Job Satisfaction: A Multidimensional
Analysis, 15(2) POLICE Q. 157, 170 (2012).
67. Ariel et al., supra note 5, at 457 (quoting GEORGE L. KELLING, NAT’L INST. OF
JUSTICE, “BROKEN WINDOWS” AND POLICE DISCRETION 6 (1999)).
68. Koen, supra note 10, at 73.
69. Id. at 73, 78. Discretion here, for example, entails letting someone off with a
warning rather than a citation, i.e., being more “legalistic.” Id. at 73–74.
70. Id. at 75–76.
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police cultures and the way in which they frame and consequently
perceive new technologies is key.
II. METHODS AND DEMOGRAPHICS
A. Methods
The findings presented in this Article are drawn from both
qualitative and quantitative data collected through fieldwork
(interviews, observation, ride-alongs) and surveys of police officers in
71
two municipal police agencies in Washington State —namely, the
Bellingham Police Department (“BPD”) and Spokane Police
Department (“SPD”). Data collection encompassed forty ride-alongs
with twenty-nine different officers, ranging in duration from a few
hours to entire ten-hour-and-forty-minute shifts; a variety of
additional informal discussions with other officers and department
administrators, and a series of four surveys administered in 2014,
2015, 2016, and 2017-2018, respectively. Ride-alongs were conducted
primarily by one of the authors (Newell), although some of the later
rides were conducted by doctoral students from the University of
Washington after being trained on study protocols for data collection.
The interviews that occurred during ride-alongs were informal and
not audio-recorded, although detailed written and audio-recorded
field notes were made during breaks and shortly after each ride.
Many of the questions asked on the questionnaires were also
addressed during interviews and discussions with officers throughout
the fieldwork. The survey questionnaires, which were designed
primarily to inform and build upon the qualitative investigation and,
as appropriate, validate whether certain themes drawn from the
qualitative work were more generalizable across the two departments,
resulted in 148, 133, 126, and 102 valid responses, respectively, across
both departments.
The first survey was administered just before and during each
department’s initial BWC pilot, from September to December 2014.
The earliest responses (BPD, n = 29) were collected on paper during

71. The general methods and respondent demographic information of this study have
been reported previously in Newell, supra note 4, 1381–84. Because this Section uses the
same dataset, much of the text here draws from that earlier paper.
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initial body-camera training meetings and prior to the actual
deployment of cameras by that agency. The remaining responses to
the first survey (n = 119) were collected (from both departments)
online between October and December 2014. The next two surveys
were administered online in May/June 2015 and June 2016,
respectively. The fourth survey was administered in June 2017 within
BPD and, due to administrative request, from mid-December 2017 to
72
mid-January 2018 within SPD. Officers (including front-line officers,
supervisors, and detectives) were sent an email containing a link to
the online questionnaire by a member of each department’s
administrative leadership along with a brief description of the
research and a statement that participation was encouraged but
entirely voluntary. Officers were presented with an information
statement outlining the risks and benefits of participation prior to
taking the survey.
On all four surveys, officers were asked qualitative and
quantitative questions designed to elicit their attitudes and concerns
about the use of BWCs within their agencies. On each survey, officers
were asked how frequently they felt BWCs should be activated in
different contexts (a normative question). For example, officers were
asked questions such as: “In your opinion, how often should wearable
cameras be used by police officers [to record encounters with
civilians?]” On the latter three surveys, officers who reported having
previously used a BWC were also asked to self-report how frequently
they activated their cameras in these same contexts. Of course, these
self-reported responses should not be read as necessarily being an
accurate proxy for how frequently cameras were actually activated,
but it is interesting to compare officers’ normative judgments about
activation with how they characterize their own activation practices,
especially when they self-report activating less frequently than they
73
report they should be. All four surveys included questions about

72. The questionnaire was scheduled to be administered in June 2017, to coincide
with the administration in Bellingham, but it was delayed at the request of the department
due to the volume of surveys the Spokane Police Department’s officers had been asked to
complete in early 2017 (from other sources).
73. As another note of caution, it is not clear from our data whether, or how much,
existing departmental activation policies impacted officers’ responses to either the
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activation during all police-public interactions (the example question
above), during arrest situations, and during traffic stops, while
additional context-based prompts were added on Survey 2 (recording
inside homes and during domestic violence calls) and on Survey 3
(recording inside medical facilities, recording witness and victim
statements).
Officers were also asked Likert-scale questions about whether
they felt the use of BWCs would decrease their ability to use
discretion in their work and how likely they thought it was that BWC
use would expose officers to increased numbers of disciplinary
actions. In addition to these quantitative measures, respondents were
also asked the following open-ended question: “What discretion
should officers have about when to record? – for instance, should
officers be required to record ALL encounters with civilians? Why or
why not?” Findings regarding officers’ privacy-related concerns,
primarily as they related to public disclosure under state access to
74
information laws, were reported previously.
B. Agency and Respondent Demographics
At the midpoint of the study, BPD employed over 110 sworn
personnel, with over 60 personnel assigned to patrol (including K-9),
and over 50 non-sworn civilian personnel. The department had
jurisdiction over 31.7 square miles and served a population of over
83,000 citizens. At the same point in time, SPD employed over 310
sworn personnel, with over 140 personnel assigned to patrol, and just
over 100 non-sworn civilian personnel. The department had a
jurisdiction of roughly 76 square miles and served a population of
over 210,000 citizens.
Across all four surveys, the vast majority of respondents were
male, ranging from 83.7% (BPD, Survey 2) to 92.6% (SPD, Survey 4).
The low number of female respondents (ranging from 4.4% to 16.3%
by department, per survey) does limit the generalizability of analyzing
normative or descriptive questions about how frequently activation should occur or had
occurred.
74. For findings regarding officers’ privacy-related concerns, primarily as they related
to public disclosure under state access to information laws, see Newell, supra note 4, at
1335, 1381, 1384–93.
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results by sex, but the response rate does generally reflect the overall
demographic composition of the two departments. At the midpoint of
the study, the total population of sworn officers at BPD was
approximately 84.0% male and 16.0% female, and the total
population of SPD employees (not just sworn officers) was 75.6%
75
male and 24.4% female. Qualitative interviews and ride-alongs were
also conducted with a sample of officers that generally matched these
populations (predominantly male but including some female officers
as well; five of the forty ride-alongs were conducted with three
different female officers).

Agency

BPD

SPD

Combined

Survey

n

Male

Female

No response
(NR)

1

50

88.0%

12.0%

-

2

49

83.7%

16.3%

-

3

56

85.7%

12.5%

1.8%

4

36

85.3%

11.8%

2.9%

1

98

88.8%

9.2%

2.0%

2

84

90.5%

7.1%

2.4%

3

70

88.6%

5.7%

5.7%

4

68

92.6%

4.4%

2.9%

1

148

88.5%

10.1%

1.4%

2

133

88.0%

10.5%

1.5%

3

126

87.3%

8.7%

4.0%

4

102

90.2%

6.9%

2.9%

Table 1. Sex of Respondents (by Department) Across the Four
Surveys.

75. We were not able to get precise numbers for just the sworn personnel at SPD.

96 N.C. L. REV. 1525 (2018)

2018]

THE CHOICE TO RECORD

1545

Most respondents on each survey reported being between thirtyfive and fifty-four years of age, with very few reporting being under
twenty-four or older than sixty-four. Likewise, those we interviewed
during ride-alongs were also generally between the ages of twentyfour and fifty-four.
Survey

n

18–24 25–34

35–44

45–54 55–64

1

148

2

133

-

9.0%

43.6% 37.6% 7.5% 0.8% 1.5%

3

126

0.8%

8.7%

33.3% 44.4% 8.7%

-

4.0%

4

102

-

13.7% 33.3% 44.1% 6.9%

-

2.0%

0.7% 16.2% 42.6% 33.1% 5.4%

65+

NR

-

2.0%

Table 2. Ages of Respondents Across All Four Surveys.
The majority of respondents on each survey reported having
worked in a law enforcement capacity for more than ten years, with
only a very small number reporting less than five years of professional
law enforcement experience. Regarding the ride-alongs, most officers
we interviewed had more than five years of experience, but a few
were also newer officers (a couple having only recently completed
their field training).
Survey

n

< 1 yr

1–2 yrs 3–5 yrs 5–10 yrs

> 10 yrs

NR

1

148

2.0%

0.7%

5.4%

21.6%

68.9%

1.4%

2

133

-

1.5%

1.5%

13.5%

82.0%

1.5%

3

126

-

0.8%

2.4%

14.3%

79.4%

3.2%

4

102

-

2.0%

7.8%

7.8%

80.4%

2.0%

Table 3. Reported Time in Law Enforcement Across All Four
Surveys.
Across the four surveys, regular officers (patrol, traffic, crime
prevention, etc., including both junior and senior patrol officers)
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constituted between 45.1% and 63.5% of all respondents. Between
23.6% and 30.4% of respondents on each survey reported serving in
supervisory positions (designated “Supervisor” in Figures 3a–3c),
including corporal (SPD only), sergeant, lieutenant, captain (SPD
only), and major (SPD only). Additionally, between 7.9% and 11.3%
of respondents reported being detectives or crime scene investigators.
Ride-alongs were conducted primarily with regular patrol officers but
also included three sergeants, two corporals, and one crime scene
investigator. Additional interviews and informal conversations were
conducted with higher ranking members of the departments’
command staff, civilian staff, and additional patrol officers.
All respondents to each survey reported having attended college
or university, with a majority on each survey having earned a fouryear baccalaureate degree. Approximately 20% of respondents
reported having obtained a two-year associates degree, and between
2.7% and 7.8% having obtained a graduate degree. This question was
not typically asked during informal interviews.
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Survey 1

Survey 2

Survey 3

Survey 4

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

Major

-

-

-

-

-

-

1

1.0

Captain

1

0.7

3

2.3

3

2.4

2

2.0

Lieutenant

8

5.4

10

7.5

8

6.3

6

5.9

14.9

19

14.3

20

15.9

21

2.7

5

3.8

5

4.0

1

1.0

8.1

15

*

11.3

10

7.9

9

*

8.8

Senior
** 28
Officer

18.9

21

15.8

14

11.1

13

12.7

Officer 66

44.6

42

31.6

46

36.5

33

32.4

Response(s)

Sergeant 22
Corporal

*

4

Detective/CSI 12

*

*

*

*

*

20.6

Admin/Other

-

-

-

-

1

0.8

1

1.0

Did not
report

8

5.4

19

14.3

20

15.9

17

16.7

TOTAL 148

133

126

102

* Includes one or more response where the rank of “Sergeant” and the position of
“Detective” were both indicated. In these cases, respondents were coded as both (and
as supervisors).
**
Only applies to SPD, as BPD does not separate these officers into junior and senior
ranks.

Table 4. Reported Rank/Position of Respondents, by Survey.
Roughly 84% to 87% of respondents on each survey reported
being “White,” with small percentages of respondents identifying as
“Hispanic,” “Black/African-American,” “American Indian/Alaska
Native,” “Asian,” or “Hawaiian/Pacific Islander” (see Table 5,
below). These responses generally match the populations at both
departments, as BPD’s population is approximately 90% White, 5.4%
Asian and Pacific Islander, and 4.5% Black/African-American (with a
few employees who identify as Hispanic in addition to one of the
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previous categories). On the other hand, SPD’s population is
approximately 91.9% White, 3.0% Hispanic, 1.5% Black/AfricanAmerican, 1.5% American Indian/Alaska Native, and 1.8%
Asian/Hawaiian/Pacific Islander (with another 1.0% “Other”). Ridealongs were primarily conducted with white officers, although some
informal interviews were conducted with non-white officers.

Response(s)
White

Survey 1

Survey 2

Survey 3

Survey 4

n

n

n

n

%

86

84.3%

%

%

%

130 87.8% 116 87.2% 107 84.9%

Black/African
American

3

2.0%

2

1.5%

2

1.6%

2

2.0%

Asian

2

*

1.4%

2

1.5% 3

***

2.4%

2*

2.0%

Hispanic

5

*

3.4%

3

*

2.3%

2

*

1.6%

5*

4.9%

American
Indian/Alaska
Native

3

*

2.0%

4

*

3.0%

2

1.6%

0

0.0%

Hawaiian/Pacific
Islander

1

0.7%

1

0.8% 1

***

0.8%

1

1.0%

**

1.4% 4

**

3.0% 3

**

2.4%

3

2.9%

No Response

6

4.1%

7

5.3%

11

8.7%

7

6.9%

Total

148

-

133

-

126

-

102

Other

2

* Includes one or more response where “White” was also selected as a primary racial
category.
** Responses include: [blank], “American,” “‘Merican,” and “Human.”
*** Includes one response indicating both “Asian” and “Native Hawaiian/Pacific
Islander.”

Table 5. Reported Racial/Ethnic Backgrounds of Respondents,
by Survey.
In terms of political attitudes, the highest percentages of
respondents generally reported their political leanings as being
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“conservative” (24.5% to 32.5% across surveys) or “moderate
conservative” (27.7% to 35.3%), followed by a smaller number of
respondents who reported being “moderate” (16.7% to 22.6%). Only
very small numbers of respondents (fewer than 6%) reported being
on the “liberal” side of the political spectrum, while 7.9% to 11.8%
reported being “very conservative.” This question was not generally
discussed during informal interviews.
III. FINDINGS
In the subsections below, we detail (1) officers’ normative
assessments about activation, including what officers reported was the
appropriate level of activation in each of these contexts as well as
their self-reported perceptions about whether BWCs would diminish
officer discretion; and (2) how frequently officers self-reported
actually activating their cameras in these same contexts (as a point of
comparison to officers’ normative responses).
A. Desired Levels of Discretion
Most of the responding officers reported that some degree of
discretion regarding camera activation was appropriate, although a
minority did support the “always on, no discretion” approach. Those
officers who did support always-on activation policies often cited trust
(or the lack of trust) as a primary reason for opposing officer
discretion in activation policies—framing the requirement to “record
everything” as a mechanism to preemptively shield officers against
unjustified criticism or unfounded claims of misconduct by
supervisors, the media, and the public. One sergeant, assigned to an
internal affairs unit, stressed that activation was important “to avoid
the accusation that [officers] are ‘selectively’ recording incidents to
avoid showing bad behavior,” adding that he has “seen the cameras
work to the advantage of officers more times than not.”
Officers’ desire to protect themselves by documenting policepublic contacts also appears to stem from the feeling held by some
officers that “every contact is a potential threat and should be
recorded.” This focus on overcoming mistrust by documenting all
their police-public interactions was often complemented by officers’
stated belief that their departments were not full of “bad apples” and
deserved more respect from members of their communities. Some
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officers expressed strong opinions on this issue. As one officer
explained, “[t]he main reason to record all encounters is to make sure
that the officer is protected from false accusations of misconduct. The
officers of the [department] are professional and ethical people. They
do not abuse anyone.” Another noted, “If the citizens think we can’t
be trusted they shouldn’t be bitching when we record everything! I
think we should record every encounter with a citizen.”
Some officers reported that they saw frequent activation as a
means of producing video that could inform citizens about what real,
daily, police work looked like, with the hope of educating the public
about both the boring and stressful aspects of their jobs. One officer
expressed this sentiment by explaining that “[t]he public wants to see
what we do and the best way for them [to do so] is to see how we deal
with a high stress situation.” Others echoed concerns about officers
not wanting to engage with the cameras at all; for example, one
officer expressed the sentiment that “there has to be an all-activation
approach or else some cops would never turn it on.” Others felt that
frequent activation was important because it resulted in the collection
of better evidence to use in prosecuting the cases they investigated.
Alternatively, some officers noted that “unpredictability of police
work” and the difficulty of knowing, ex ante, whether an interaction
should be recorded worked in favor of limited discretion.
Yet, some officers also felt that any attempt to record everything
was “an exercise in futility” because, as one lieutenant stated, “[i]t
doesn’t matter, because the one time you forget, or don’t [record,]
people will say you were hiding something.” A sergeant stated
forcefully: “Any application of officer discretion to not record would
be viewed as deliberate intent to conceal unacceptable conduct.
Remove all discretion. Record everything and watch ‘productivity’ go
into a free fall.” Additionally, some officers in favor of recording all
encounters also expressed concerns that they would be punished for
forgetting to activate their cameras in every situation they
encountered.
Responses to the quantitative survey questions are generally
consistent with these qualitative findings. Notably, a small percentage
of officers reported that cameras should “always” be activated during
encounters with members of the public (15.5%, 17.3%, 15.1%, and
9.8%, respectively, by survey). However, when asked about activation
in other, more specific, contexts, these percentages generally
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increased. For example, closer to half of the respondents reported
that cameras should “always” be activated during arrest situations.
Table 6, below, includes more details.
“Always” or “Most of
the Time” (%)

“Always” (%)
Context
S1

S2

S3

S4

S1

S2

S3

S4

All public
encounters

15.5

17.3

15.1

9.8

51.4

52.6

55.6

53.9

Arrest
situations

42.6

51.1

51.6

63.7

77.7

88.0

93.7

90.2

Traffic stops

41.2

45.9

48.4

53.9

75.7

78.2

90.5

86.3

Inside
homes

-

15.8

15.1

16.7

-

42.1

54.8

62.7

Domestic
violence
calls

-

39.8

40.5

52.0

-

74.4

86.5

84.3

Inside
medical
facilities

-

-

7.9

4.9

-

-

32.5

30.4

Witness
statements

-

-

27.0

30.4

-

-

65.1

70.6

Victim
statements

-

-

21.4

28.4

-

-

61.1

65.7

Table 6. Percentage of Officers Who Reported That BWCs
Should Be Activated “Always” or “Most of the Time” During
Each Context, by Survey.
As depicted in Figure 1, officers also reported that activation
should happen more frequently across contexts as time went on.
Officer opinion that BWC activation should happen during most or
all public-police interactions (that is, combining responses for
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“always” or “most of the time”) rose slightly across surveys (51.4%,
52.6%, 55.6%, 53.9%), as it did for arrests (77.7%, 88.0%, 93.7%,
90.2%), traffic stops (75.7%, 78.2%, 90.5%, 86.3%), recording inside
homes (42.1%, 54.8%, 62.7%), and during domestic violence calls
(74.4%, 86.5%, 84.3%).
100.0%
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%

Survey 1

All

Arrests

Traffic
stops

Survey 2

DV
calls

Wit.
stmts

Survey 3

Victim Inside
stmts homes

Survey 4

Med.
fac.

Survey 1 51.4% 77.7% 75.7%
Survey 2 52.6% 88.0% 78.2% 74.4%

42.1%

Survey 3 55.6% 93.7% 90.5% 86.5% 65.1% 61.1% 54.8% 32.5%
Survey 4 53.9% 90.2% 86.3% 84.3% 70.6% 65.7% 62.7%

30%

Figure 1. Percentage of Respondents Who Indicated BWCs
Should Be Activated “Always” or “Most of the Time” in Each
Context, Across Both Departments.
However, as we see from Figures 2a and 2b, the responses varied
by department, with SPD officers consistently more likely to report
that frequent BWC activation was appropriate in certain
circumstances; in some cases, they were considerably more likely to
76
be in favor of more frequent activation. There may be many
76. On Survey 1, SPD respondents were significantly more likely than BPD
respondents to support more frequent activation during all police-public encounters (U =
1777.5, Z = -2.857, p = 0.004) and during traffic stops (U = 1838, Z = -2.637, p = .008), but
not during arrest situations. On Survey 2, SPD respondents were significantly more likely
than BPD respondents to support more frequent activation during arrest situations (U =
1608.5, Z = -2.321, p = .02), during traffic stops (U = 1614, Z = -2.224, p = .026), and while
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variables that contributed to these differences, although it is difficult
to say what the specific causes might have been. Some of this variance
may be attributable to different activation policies in effect in each
department. This seems especially likely in the case of recording
inside homes, as BPD officers were instructed, at one point early in
their body-camera pilot, to not record inside private residences due to
privacy-related concerns. In any case, these findings suggest that BPD
officers understood BWCs as appropriate tools in a particular range
of circumstances—including during arrests, traffic stops, and domestic
violence calls—but not necessarily in terms of constant recording or
with the purpose of capturing all interactions an officer might have
over the course of a shift. SPD officers, on the other hand, appeared
to understand BWCs more as broadly applicable tools, useful across a
broader range of contexts.

inside private homes (U = 1650, Z = -1.992, p = .046). The difference for recording during
all police-public encounters was not significant, but marginally so (U = 1661.5, Z = -1.952,
p = .051). On Survey 3, SPD respondents were statistically more likely to support frequent
activation in every context except arrest situations: during all police-public encounters (U
= 1157.5, Z = -4.127, p < .001), during traffic stops (U = 1525.5, Z = -2.367, p = .018), while
recording inside homes (U = 864, Z = -5.630, p < .001) and medical facilities (U = 1389.5, Z
= -2.920, p = .003), while recording witness statements (U = 815.5, Z = -5.879, p < .001) and
victim statements (U = 812.5, Z = -5.892, p < .001), and during domestic violence calls (U =
1590, Z = -1.987, p = .047). Finally, on Survey 4, SPD respondents were statistically more
likely to support frequent activation during all police-public encounters (U = 858.5, Z = 2.237, p < .025), while recording inside homes (U = 792.5, Z = -2.737, p = .006) and medical
facilities (U = 838, Z = -2.395, p = .017), and while recording witness statements (U =
625.5, Z = -3.967, p < .001) and victim statements (U = 601.5, Z = -4.116, p < .001).
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BPD (S1)

100.0%
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%

BPD (S2)

SPD (S1)

All

Arrests

Traffic
stops

BPD (S1)

32.0%

70.0%

64.0%

BPD (S2)

42.9%

85.7%

73.5%

SPD (S1)

61.2%

81.6%

81.6%

SPD (S2)

58.3%

93.7%

81.0%
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SPD (S2)

DV calls

Inside
homes

65.3%

26.5%

79.8%

51.2%

Figure 2a. Percentage of Respondents Who Indicated BWCs
Should Be Activated “Always” or “Most of the Time” in Each
Context, by Department, from Surveys 1, 2.

BPD (S3)

100.0%
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
All

Arrests

Traffic
stops

DV
calls

BPD (S4)

Wit.
stmts

SPD (S3)

Victim Inside
stmts homes

SPD (S4)

Med.
Fac.

BPD (S3) 37.5% 91.1% 85.7% 78.6% 37.5% 30.4% 25.0% 16.1%
BPD (S4) 35.3% 97.1% 94.1% 91.2% 50.0% 38.2% 44.1% 11.8%
SPD (S3) 70.0% 95.7% 94.3% 92.9% 87.1% 85.7% 78.6% 45.7%
SPD (S4) 63.2% 86.8% 82.4% 80.9% 80.9% 79.4% 72.1% 39.7%

Figure 2b. Percentage of Respondents Who Indicated BWCs
Should Be Activated “Always” or “Most of the Time” in Each
Context, by Department, from Surveys 3, 4.
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The response to these questions also varied substantially by rank,
with those in more senior or supervisory roles more in favor of
frequent activation than those assigned as regular patrol officers (in
terms of raw percentages). This unsurprising finding is true for every
context across all four surveys and, in some cases, the percentage
difference is greater than 30 points. When comparing “Supervisors”
with “Officers” combined across both departments, we find
77
statistically significant differences. For example, on Survey 3,
supervisors reported that frequent activation was appropriate during
all police-public encounters at a rate of 78.4% compared to 46.7% of
regular front-line officers. A much higher percentage of supervisors
also reported that recording inside homes should occur frequently
than regular patrol officers did (67.6% compared to 41.7%), as
indicated in Figures 3a–3c, below.

77. On Survey 1, respondents who reported being Supervisors were significantly more
likely than those who reported being (non-supervisor) Officers to support more frequent
activation in all three contexts: during all police-public encounters (U = 1136.5, Z = -2.810,
p = 0.005), during arrest situations (U = 1247, Z = -2.260, p = .024), and during traffic stops
(U = 1233.5, Z = -2.323, p = .020) (this analysis excludes those in the Unknown category).
On Survey 2, Supervisors were significantly more likely than Officers to support more
frequent activation during arrest situations (U = 767.5, Z = -3.072, p = .002) and during
traffic stops (U = 824.5, Z = -2.515, p = .012). On Survey 3, SPD Supervisors were
statistically more likely than Officers to support frequent activation in every context
except domestic violence calls: during all police-public encounters (U = 742.5, Z = -2.875, p
= .004), during arrest situations (U = 772.5, Z = -2.827, p = .005), during traffic stops (U =
781.5, Z = -2.448, p = .006), while recording inside homes (U = 792, Z = -2.448, p < .014)
and medical facilities (U = 779.5, Z = -2.561, p = .010), and while recording witness
statements (U = 781.5, Z = -2.537, p < .011) and victim statements (U = 829, Z = -2.168, p <
.030). Finally, on Survey 4, Supervisors were statistically more likely to support frequent
activation during all police-public encounters (U = 470.5, Z = -2.713, p < .007), but not in
other contexts.
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Ofc. (S1)
Sup. (S2)

All
encounters
with
civilians

Arrests

Traffic
stops

DV calls

Inside
homes

Sup. (S1)

71.4%

88.6%

94.3%

0.0%

0.0%

Ofc. (S1)

45.7%

74.5%

69.1%

0.0%

0.0%

Unk. (S1)

42.1%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Sup. (S2)

63.9%

97.2%

88.9%

83.3%

44.4%

Ofc. (S2)

43.8%

82.8%

67.2%

71.9%

40.6%

Unk. (S2)

57.6%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Figure 3a. Percentage of Respondents Who Indicated BWCs
Should Be Activated “Always” or “Most of the Time” in Each
Context, by Seniority, from Surveys 1 and 2.
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Officers

Unknown

Victim Inside
stmts homes

Med.
fac.

Supervisors 78.4% 100.0% 97.3% 89.2% 75.7% 70.3% 67.6% 43.2%
Officers

46.7% 88.3% 86.7% 81.7% 53.3% 50.0% 41.7% 26.7%

Unknown

44.8% 96.6% 89.7% 93.1% 75.9% 75.9% 65.5% 31.0%

Figure 3b. Percentage of Respondents Who Indicated BWCs
Should Be Activated “Always” or “Most of the Time” in Each
Context, by Seniority, from Survey 3.
Supervisors

100.0%
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
All

Arrests

Traffic
stops

DV
calls

Wit.
stmts

Officers

Unknown

Victim Inside
stmts homes

Med.
fac.

Supervisors 80.6% 100.0% 100.0% 93.5% 87.1% 77.4% 71.0% 38.7%
Officers

45.7% 87.0% 82.6% 87.0% 65.2% 58.7% 63.0% 23.9%

Unknown

36.0% 84.0% 76.0% 68.0% 60.0% 64.0% 52.0% 32.0%

Figure 3c. Percentage of Respondents Who Indicated BWCs
Should Be Activated “Always” or “Most of the Time” in Each
Context, by Seniority, from Survey 4.
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As stated above, most officers did support some amount of
officer discretion about when to record. For these officers, discretion
provided a means to have more honest, trusted, and authentic
interactions with members of the public (as well as other officers); to
avoid violating privacy or recording extremely sensitive (and
potentially embarrassing or traumatic) situations or statements; and
to minimize the amount of work required to annotate, tag, and
sometimes watch footage. As outlined by one detective:
Officers should not be required to record all interactions with
the public. The majority of contacts are non-criminal in nature.
People should be able to feel they can approach officers,
without fear or concern they are going to be recorded. The
camera could have a dampening effect on reporting crimes, if
people believe they are always being recorded.
These concerns were compounded by liberal public disclosure
requirements in local public records law and officer perceptions that
the video they produced was likely to be disclosed to the public and
78
end up online (e.g., on YouTube.com). In this regard, one senior
patrol officer stated:
I don’t have an issue recording every issue with citizens.
However, the video should not be so easy to get through a
[public] records request for just anybody to view. On incidents
with a bridge jumper, for example, I feel we should record that,
but we shouldn’t have to tell the person we are recording so
they don’t think they have an audience. We should still record it
for future civil law suits.
Several officers were concerned that citizens would be less
willing to disclose information if officers could not choose to turn off
their cameras. Officers also frequently cited privacy and sensitivityrelated concerns (e.g., when interviewing rape victims or speaking to
informants). The threat to citizen privacy was often viewed through
the lens of public disclosure. Various officers suggested limits on who
could access video or, at least, that they should have the flexibility to
turn off a camera during sexual assault (and other sensitive) calls. The
78. For more details about the local public disclosure law and officers’ perceptions
towards public disclosure of their footage, see Newell, supra note 4, at 1363–80, 1384–93.
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feeling that a “rape victim’s statements should not be accessible to a
simple public information request” was not appropriate because it
“could victimize them further” was echoed by several officers; others
stated that officers should be able to choose not to record “citizens in
mental crisis, medical crisis, or victims of a crime” when public
disclosure was possible or likely. One officer stated, “Officer’s should
have discretion. I’ve dealt with people whose loved one passed away
naturally and they didn’t want it recorded for someone to get a copy
and post it on the internet.” Here, too, some officers appear to view
discretion as a tool by which officers can protect bystanders and noncriminal persons of interest from the public disclosure laws that many
79
of them disagree with in the first place. Some officers also refer to
other types of threats which may follow from public disclosure (for
example, burglars staking out a house prior to breaking and
80
entering). Officer privacy was also mentioned as a reason for
allowing discretion. Officers were concerned that their private
conversations (both with friends, family, or other colleagues) might
be recorded and become subject to public disclosure requests.
Similarly, some officers also expressed concern over certain actions
being misinterpreted when viewed by others. As one officer
remarked, “[officers] sometimes vent or laugh as a coping mechanism
and it could be misunderstood” by outside viewers. Likewise, in
survey responses, almost half of the officers agreed that “wearing a
body camera will diminish officer discretion (e.g. to not issue a
citation in certain circumstances).”
The tension between documenting everything to protect
themselves and capture evidence and the risks to others that
recording might impose was felt acutely by some officers. For
example, at one point during a ride-along, an officer arrested a known
gang member who also happened to be the officer’s confidential
informant. After recording the arrest, the officer turned the camera
off and sat down in the back seat of the patrol car with the arrestee to
talk. After a few minutes, the officer emerged from the back of the

79. See id.
80. We are not aware of any incidents where something like this has actually occurred.
It seems unlikely that these concerns are based on prior experience, or that such an issue
presents a particularly pressing problem.
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car, turned his camera back on, and proceeded to record the rest of
our drive to the local jail where the arrestee was booked. On one
hand, recording such a conversation with an informant could increase
the risk to the informant, should others find out he or she had talked.
On the other hand, the gap in the recording could likewise subject the
arrestee to risk, at least when public disclosure laws require the
release of such footage upon request, and it could also potentially
open the officer to undocumented claims of misconduct.
36.1%

40.0%

Survey 2

27.8%

30.0%

17.3%

20.0%
12.0%

6.8%

10.0%
0.0%
Strongly agree
40.0%

27.0%

30.0%
20.0%

Somewhat
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Unsure

35.3%

35.0%
25.0%

Somewhat
agree

19.8%
14.7%

Survey 3

Survey 4

23.0%
17.5%19.6%

15.7%

15.0%

13.7%
12.7%

10.0%
5.0%
0.0%
Strongly agree Somewhat Neither agree
agree
nor disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Strongly
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Figure 4. Responses to the Question: “Wearing a Body Camera
Will Diminish Officer Discretion (e.g. To Not Issue a Citation
in Certain Circumstances).”
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On the latter three surveys, 48.1%, 46.8%, and 50.0% of
respondents, respectively, agreed that BWCs would limit officer
discretion, while 45.1%, 35.7%, and 29.4%, respectively, disagreed.
Only 17.3%, 12.7%, and 13.7%, respectively strongly disagreed, while
12%, 19.8%, and 14.7%, respectively, strongly agreed. There was
some difference between departments, although the differences were
not always in the same direction (BPD officers reported 40.8%
agreement on Survey 2, compared to 52.4% of SPD officers; 50%
compared to 44.3% on Survey 3; and 38.2% compared to 55.9% on
Survey 4).
Officers exercise discretion in a broad sense throughout their line
of work. BWCs may restrict their willingness and perceived ability to
exercise discretion in several ways. Our data is consistent with that of
other authors in the sense that many officers are concerned about
81
“Monday-morning quarterbacking.”
As one officer remarked,
“[Monday-morning quarterbacking] is already occurring. The current
trend is to hand out as much discipline as possible to officers for any
situation which is handled less than perfectly in the opinion of that
particular captain. Cameras aid in that process.”
Officers also fear that the public (and in some cases, supervisors)
do not understand the nuances of policing and what is sometimes
required to achieve an effective outcome. One quote stood out in the
sense that it reveals how important discretion can be but how it could
simultaneously be misconstrued:
Anyone who has tried talking with a known street criminal with
a “Hello sir the reason I’m contacting you today. . .” will
instantly lose credibility with this contact, thus compromising
officer safety. But if you approach this same street criminal with
a “Bro, what’s the word on the street?” you’ll be called a racist,
insensitive or otherwise unprofessional.
These tensions are reminiscent of the discrepancy described by
He et al.: on the one hand, police work requires officers to exercise a
great deal of discretion but, on the other, they are strongly bound by
administrative rules (as police organizations are highly bureaucratic
81. See, e.g., Koen, supra note 10, at 73 (noting “[o]ne of the more common phrases
mentioned by [the] officers during interviews was: ‘Monday morning quarterbacking,’”
which refers to the public’s ex post facto judgment about an officer’s decision making).
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82

in nature), and this causes additional stress. In this case, however,
the discrepancy concerns unwritten rules of social convention to
which officers are subjected.
Interestingly, very few respondents on the first three surveys
(8.1%, 4.5%, and 9.5%, by survey and across departments) reported
that BWC use was “very likely” to lead to increased numbers of
disciplinary actions against officers. Similarly, combining “very likely”
or “somewhat likely” responses only captured only about 20–30% of
the total across these three surveys (see Figure 5). A supervisor with
some experience in the Internal Affairs division of one of the
departments stated that BWCs generally “protect officers against
false allegations, while protecting citizens from ‘he said, she said’
stalemates.”
89.7%

100.0%
80.0%
60.0%
40.0%

38.0%
23.5%

21.4%
20.4%

32.1%
28.6%

Survey 1

Survey 2

Survey 3

20.0%

17.6%

0.0%

BPD

Survey 4

SPD

Figure 5: Percentage of Respondents who Indicated BWC Use
Was “Very Likely” or “Somewhat Likely” to Increase the
Number of Disciplinary Actions Brought Against Officers, by
Department.
We also see that higher percentages of regular officers generally
reported agreement that BWCs would lead to increased discipline
82. See Ni He, Jihong Zhao & Carol A. Archbold, Gender and Police Stress: The
Convergent and Divergent Impact of Work Environment, Work-Family Conflict, and Stress
Coping Mechanisms of Female and Male Police Officers, 25 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE
STRATEGIES & MGMT. 687, 690–91 (2002) (noting the conflict caused by the requirement
that officers “exercise considerable discretion while being tightly controlled by a plethora
of administrative rules surrounding their work”).
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than did supervisors (see Figure 6). On Survey 4, however, while BPD
respondents indicated roughly similar responses (2.9% very likely,
14.7% somewhat likely), SPD respondents reported that increased
disciplinary action was much more likely, at 58.8% indicating that
such an increase was “very likely” and an additional 30.9% indicating
it was “somewhat likely” (see Figures 5 and 6 for related data). It is
unclear from our data what drove this spike, but it likely reflects
either officer experience during the intervening period or altered
expectations based on a change in departmental leadership (as a new
chief of police with a stated commitment to departmental
accountability to the Spokane community was hired in the intervening
83
period ). As one officer put it, “recently it appears the Department is
overly consumed with whether or not our cameras are on as if we are
not trusted.” Some officers also felt strongly that the cameras were
being used unjustly by administrators as accountability tools. In the
words of one officer, administrators had begun “imposing their own
morals and opinions on my actions,” an indication that the
department’s “policy protects the administration, but the officers
have minimal protection from admin, and zero from the public
release of every word spoken on every day in every scenario by
people who condemn a single misspoken sentence as though we are
murderers.”
Additionally, one SPD officer who had transitioned into
investigations after initially being assigned a BWC reported, on
Survey 4, a continuing “fear of being disciplined even though nothing
was done wrong” due to perceived lack of clarity about how the law
applied to the use of BWCs and officer accountability. Other officers
also expressed concerns that “footage is not used by [the]
prosecutor’s office and is only being used for [officer] discipline.”
Similarly, another officer expressed concerns that, “if the officer sees
something that is not captured on the camera, the assumption will be
83. See Mitch Ryals, Craig Meidl Named Chief of Spokane Police Department,
INLANDER (Aug. 1, 2016, 12:48 PM), https://www.inlander.com/Bloglander/archives/2016
/08/01/craig-meidl-named-chief-of-spokane-police-department
[https://perma.cc/7A2B5FH7]; Shawn Vestal, Shawn Vestal: Spokane Police Chief Craig Meidl has Defied the
Fears of his Critics to Become a Model Leader, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Dec. 17, 2017, 6:00
AM), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2017/dec/17/shawn-vestal-spokane-police-chiefcraig-meidl-has-/ [https://perma.cc/S8RA-4QJY].
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made that it didn’t occur, and the officer’s integrity will be called into
question.” Another elaborated a little more: “Right now, we’re
having issues getting our footage into court and then having it used
against us when it does get in (e.g., officers discussing [probable
cause] and defense saying we didn’t know what we were doing). It’s a
double edge sword in court right now.” Beyond general
accountability for disciplining officers, one officer expressed the
concern that “police and city administration” might use BWC footage
“to identify and target officers who do not share the same
religious/political beliefs.” It is likely that these sorts of concerns in
combination with a lingering lack of clarity or understanding about
the law’s application to the use of BWCs and related accountability
processes amongst officers could have contributed to the spike in
responses indicating that disciplinary action was a likely result
stemming from BWC deployment.
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Figure 6: Percentage of Respondents Who Indicated BWC Use
Was “Very Likely” or “Somewhat Likely” to Increase the
Number of Disciplinary Actions Brought Against Officers, by
Department and Rank (Supervisor, Officer, or Unknown).
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Relatedly, on Survey 4, while a third to more than half of BPD
respondents across categories (supervisor, officer, or unknown)
reported that increased disciplinary actions were “somewhat
unlikely” or “very unlikely” to arise as a consequence of BWC use,
very few SPD respondents responded similarly (with only 5.6% of
supervisors indicating “somewhat unlikely”; see Figure 7).
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15.4%

0.0%

16.7%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Figure 7: Responses to Question About How Likely BWC Use
Would Lead to Increase Numbers of Disciplinary Actions
Against Officers, by Department and Rank (Supervisor,
Officer, or Unknown), on Survey 4.
Discounting the spike by SPD respondents in Survey 4, we
expected more responses to indicate a “very likely” expectation than
turned out to be the case. Because our qualitative responses show a
recurring emphasis on themes of accountability and concerns over
Monday-morning quarterbacking, we initially theorized that this
would be reflected through strong expectations of increased
disciplinary actions. However, it is quite possible that officers were
concerned about the possibility of Monday-morning quarterbacking
while, at the same time, also experienced relatively little of it in
practice. If so, it is then conceivable that many would discount the
possibility of increased disciplinary action as being “very likely,”
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while still harboring concerns. However, when officer experience
changes and concern is elevated to reality (as may have been the case
for SPD in Survey 4) it stands to reason that expectations of
disciplinary action would rise accordingly. Finally, the discrepancy
can be further explained due to the fact that there are many other
ways of being held accountable: Monday-morning quarterbacking
does not by definition lead to disciplinary action. Scrutiny takes many
forms, and disciplinary action is only one of them.
Another area in which officers’ exercise discretion concerns the
use of force. Several officers worry that the implementation of BWCs
alongside Monday-morning quarterbacking will lead officers to use
less force than is required or justified, ultimately jeopardizing officer
safety. One officer stated that the decision to use force has been
replaced with the decision to estimate how others will perceive that use
of force. Interestingly, although officer discretion is usually thought of
as “letting someone off the hook” the reverse is sometimes true
here—rather than “conforming” by using the appropriate amount of
force in situations in which policy would allow it, officers reported
feeling obligated to use their discretion to de-escalate the situation
and essentially be more lenient.
Even though many officers resist the idea of their cameras always
being on and recording everything, they also frequently express
concern over the act of having to turn on the camera. It stands to
reason that this issue is amplified by the possibility of scrutiny if they
fail to turn it on in a critical situation. And, as one officer mentioned,
in addition to turning the camera on, officers also must “[advise] the
person or persons of the recording” and “constantly evaluate if they
can legally or within policy continue the recording.” Our data also
shows that some officers feel that policy and law are unclear on this
point, and this uncertainty and perceived ambiguity may ultimately
affect their decision to use discretion to turn the cameras on or off.
Another commonly recurring issue (closely related to the
Monday-morning quarterbacking complaint) concerns the fact that
officers believe that the public will mistakenly assume that anything
caught on camera was perceived by the officer and vice versa. A few
officers noted that this may lead to officers becoming more focused
on positioning the camera so that it captures as much as possible,
which may sometimes run in tension with their training to orient
themselves in particular ways for the sake of safety. Finally, some
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officers expressed concern that their word will no longer carry weight
unless a video is present, and fear that, in the future, prosecutors will
refuse to charge a case unless footage is present, or defense attorneys
will be able to use the lack of footage to get charges dropped.
C. Self-Reported Activation Rates
On the second and third surveys, smaller percentages of officers
reported activating their cameras frequently during police-public
encounters than reported that cameras should be activated in the
84
same circumstances. This is an interesting finding, given that we
assumed officers would generally not report activating their cameras
less frequently than they felt they should be. However, on Survey 4,
this trend reversed itself across most—but not all—of the contexts.
These observations may suggest that officers may not be averse to
somewhat stricter activation policies in these types of contexts. For
example, closer to half of the respondents (51.1%, 51.6%, and 63.7%)
reported that cameras should “always” be activated during arrest
situations, while only 37.5%, 41.4%, and 61.4% reported always
activating their own cameras in the same context. The self-corrective
responses, if they are roughly true to officers’ actual experiences,
would suggest that officers are increasingly activating their cameras as
they become more accustomed to having them as part of their daily
routine.

84. Compare the data in Table 7 with that in Table 6.
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Context

“Always” or “Most of the
Time” (%)

“Always” (%)

S2

S3

S4

18.1

*

51.8

47.1

61.4

41.4

61.4

85.7

88.5

96.4

*

35.6

51.8

78.6

75.9

86.7

19.6

*

14.9

28.9

*

39.3

49.4

68.7

Domestic
violence calls

32.1

31.0

54.2

*

73.2

79.3

91.6

Inside medical
facilities

-

4.6

6.0

-

18.4

31.3

Witness
statements

-

17.2

32.5

*

-

59.8

69.9

Victim statements

-

16.1

30.1

*

-

56.3

66.3

*

S2

S3

S4

All public
encounters

8.9

10.3

Arrest situations

37.5

Traffic stops

46.4

Inside homes

[Vol. 96

*

*

*
*
*

*

*

*

Indicates higher percentage response than to the normative results in Table 6.

Table 7. Percentage of Officers Who Reported That They
Activated Their BWCs “Always” or “Most of the Time”
During Each Context, by Survey.
Officers reported activating their cameras “always” or “most of
the time” during arrest situations, traffic stops, and domestic violence
calls much more frequently than in the other five contexts.
Respondents indicated much less frequent activation inside medical
facilities (e.g., hospitals), with a full third (33.3%) indicating they
never activated in such circumstances on Survey 3 (see Figure 8,
below, for more details).
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27.6% 3.4% 1.1%

20.7%

All
41.4%

4.6% 3.4% 3.4%

47.1%

Arrests
31.0%

48.3%

5.7% 8.0% 6.9%

40.2%

6.9% 6.9% 8.0% 2.3%

DV calls
35.6%
Traffic stops
17.2%

42.5%

8.0% 13.8%

17.2% 1.1%

Witness stmts
16.1%

23.0% 1.1%

5.7% 13.8%

40.2%

Victim stmts
14.9%

34.5%

27.6%

10.3%

12.6%

Inside homes
4.6% 13.8% 11.5%

33.3%

36.8%

Medical facilities
0.0%

20.0%

40.0%

60.0%

80.0%

100.0%

Always

Most of the time

About 50% of the time

Occasionally

Never

No Response

Figure 8. Self-Reported Responses to Questions Asking How
Often They Typically Activated Their BWC in Each Given
Context (n = 87). Data from Survey 3. Non-Responses Omitted.
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IV. ANALYSIS
If BWC activation policies are—as organizations such as the
85
ACLU suggest—indeed to be given “teeth,” then we must also
consider the possible consequences for officer behavior in terms of
turning the cameras on or off. Substantially reprimanding officers or
adopting evidentiary presumptions, should they fail to record, may
lead to officers refusing to exercise discretion in favor of citizen
privacy (to the extent they would choose to do so, if allowed).
Although the privacy argument is often hailed as an argument in
favor of officer discretion, it is often presented too simply.
Privacy is a difficult concept to grasp and is implicated in a
86
variety of ways in different contexts. The decision of whether
privacy is sufficiently implicated to warrant turning the camera off in
a particular scenario does not lend itself well to the quickly
developing situations officers are often confronted with. It stands to
reason that high-pressure and, consequently, high-stress
circumstances will eventually cause officers to misjudge a situation,
which will subsequently lead to reprimand or evidentiary
presumptions in favor of a suspect. It does not seem likely that those
same officers will risk turning the camera off for privacy
considerations in the future. Instead, it seems much more likely that
87
those officers will simply keep the camera running permanently.
The complexity of adopting strong disciplinary measures and
evidentiary presumptions (which means that theoretically, criminals
could go free through fault of an officer) and increasing the amount
of complex on-the-spot decision-making is highlighted in the
perspective, offered by a detective, that there are “so many rules
[about when to activate or not activate] right now, I honestly could
not recite them to you. Which means I am almost certainly breaking
policy, yet with absolutely no intention to do so. Damned if I do,
85. See STANLEY, supra note 24, at 4.
86. See Bert-Jaap Koops et al., A Typology of Privacy, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 483, 487
(2017) (“Privacy is notoriously hard to capture.”); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of
Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 485 (2006) (“Privacy is too complicated a concept to be
boiled down to a single essence”).
87. Theoretically, it is also possible that criminals, aware of police policy, could
attempt to trick officers into turning the cameras off—although this scenario does appear
far-fetched.
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damned if I don’t.” Because these normative measures run counter to
the nature of officers’ primary job functions, it stands to reason that
such policy would be met with significant resistance and negatively
88
However, the
shape their perception of the technology.
technological automation of BWC activation may serve to quell some
of these problems, especially as it would simultaneously remove most
officer discretion from the equation and, likewise, limit the
applicability of evidentiary presumptions against officers (unless the
evidence showed the officer manually deactivated the camera).
However, these improvements should also be met with some concern
and caution, especially when activation happens frequently and public
disclosure allows wide access to footage, as officers would then be
more limited in their ability to exercise their discretion to not record
sensitive interactions. Essentially, this would place the onus of
protecting privacy or of not exposing confidential informants on state
legislatures (regarding public disclosure law) and public records units
within police agencies.
Furthermore, policing is generally regarded as a line of work
with a very high degree of occupational stress, and the accessibility of
89
coping mechanisms is—amongst other things —considered key in
this regard. Venting or laughing with fellow officers could be
considered a positive coping mechanism, as opposed to negative
coping mechanisms which are predominantly self-destructive in
90
nature, such as (increased) drug use or social isolation. Moreover, it
is possible that inhibiting officers’ ability (or willingness) to speak
their minds freely to each other would also diminish their ability to
form meaningful connections with co-workers, thus restricting the
91
role of peer support; another key factor in reducing stress.
88. See Lum et al., supra note 57, at 155.
89. For an excellent summary of the subject matter and overview of the literature, see
generally He et al., supra note 82.
90. See id. at 691–92 (discussing examples of positive and negative “coping
strategies”).
91. See id. at 690 (noting “a substantial body of literature addresses the important role
of peer support and trust of co-workers and supervisors in buffering the effects of stress
related to police work”); Harvey J. Burnett, Jr., A Study of the Relationship Between
Police Stress and Moral Reasoning, Coping Mechanisms, and Selected Demographic
Variables 22–23 (May 2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Andrews University),
http://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1253&context=dissertations
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A key component of the frame through which officers interpret
BWC technology concerns the perceived polarization between the
police and the public. Throughout the interviews, respondents
expressed or otherwise implied that there is a severe disconnect
between how they perceive themselves (and the reality of their work)
and how outsiders perceive them, and how these different viewpoints
drive different interpretations of BWC use. This incongruence may
explain why many officers interpret the technology as, essentially,
something to be used against them. Moreover, officers often assume
that the worth of an officer’s word—which, in their view, has already
been significantly marginalized—will be diminished further through
BWC adoption because courts and the public will only believe that
something happened if it is caught on camera. Personal experience
and training have taught officers that what the camera captures is not
necessarily what the officer perceives (and vice versa). Not only in a
literal sense, but also with regards to the various nuances that a
particular incident or situation may involve. As one officer stated,
“[t]he limitations of a body-worn camera need to be taught to
[civilians] watching the video. The persons watching the video need to
understand the science of force, the [anomalies] of the effects of
adrenaline, and human behavior under stress.”
The perceived overemphasis on accountability was a prominent
theme, and officers often saw this focus on accountability as hindering
their ability to accomplish their primary police functions. These
findings are generally consistent with those of other authors, such as
92
Chan.
Similarly, our respondents express worry that BWCs
compound already existing issues regarding (lack of) trust in officers
by supervisors and the public. At the same time, although benefits to
the technology are most often framed as a safeguard against false
accusations, many officers perceive a wider range of benefits. For the
most part, these perceived benefits fit the traditional and reactive
approach to policing which still dominates law enforcement as
described by Lum et al., in the sense that BWCs assist officers in
carrying out their primary duties via improved evidence collection,
[https://perma.cc/AR26-RLLV] (discussing the relationship between officers’ support
system and stress).
92. See Janet B.L. Chan, The Technological Game: How Information Technology is
Transforming Police Practice, 1 CRIM. JUST. 139, 156 (2001).
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easier report-writing, and the (alleged) mediating effect on citizen
93
behavior.
However, several responses also suggest that some officers are
developing a broader conception of the advantages that BWCs may
bring: these officers express sincere concern that the public has lost
trust in law enforcement and consider BWCs as a way to show the
public the realities that they face and the good nature of their
intentions. For example, some officers mentioned their hope that
BWCs “will educate the public on what we see at the time of any
encounter and see how little time we have to make a decision instead
of assuming the worst.” Rather than experiencing camera footage as a
possible safeguard against accusations—a highly reactive way of
looking at things—these officers see the other side of the coin, which
is much more proactive in nature. If organizational measures can be
taken to further foster such perceptions (which may, for example,
consist of convincing officers that effective policing in the modern era
is highly reliant on community relations and demonstrating actual
evidence which shows that BWCs can improve public trust in the
police) then it stands to reason that some officers may be less
94
resentful towards accountability demands. Educating the public on
what cameras do—and perhaps more importantly, do not—could help
to further realize this effect.
In the end, activation policies need to be drafted in ways that
provide officers with clear and practical guidance, incentivize
activation in appropriate circumstances while allowing for some forms
of discretion, particularly in situations that implicate the legitimate
privacy-related concerns of bystanders, victims, witnesses, informants,
and suspects. At least in states like Washington, with liberal public
95
disclosure policies, questions of public access to footage also
substantially affect the technological frames that officers form
regarding the implications of their own BWC use. In the future, these
93. See id. at 138, 155.
94. See id. at 155; see also Lum et al., supra note 57, at 157 (explaining that “from a
policy and practice perspective, adjusting those frames (e.g., through training, technical
support, and organizational incentives) becomes important to adjusting the outcomes that
agency leaders or citizens want from technology”).
95. See Newell, supra note 4, at 1370–76 (discussing public disclosure law in
Washington).
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questions of public access to information and privacy should be
addressed by state legislatures prior to wide BWC deployment, rather
than only as an ex post reaction to otherwise predictable public
requests for potentially sensitive footage. Properly balancing
transparency interests and privacy interests in state freedom of
information law is an important, and difficult, task—and it supports
96
the practical obscurity of innocent civilians caught by cameras
intended to watch the police. However, striking a reasonable balance
might help incentivize more frequent activation in circumstances
where the potential for wide public visibility may otherwise push
against officers’ willingness to record due to privacy (or other,
related) concerns.
As noted above, supervisors generally report that cameras
should be activated more frequently than front-line officers do. At
least in terms of those in higher supervisory and administrative
positions, it seems clear that these two sets of officers might hold
different technological frames regarding the purposes, benefits, and
use of BWCs. When the frames between these groups are
incongruent, it “can result in conflicts about the development, use,
and meaning of technologies in a police organization, as well as
97
different outcomes of technology.” Questions about differences in
supervisors’ and front-line officers’ perceptions of cameras, and the
outcomes these differences drive, deserve greater focus in future
research. Relatedly, concerns over ‘Monday-morning quarterbacking’
potentially pose significant barriers to camera activation. Because
BWCs are generally seen and implemented as an accountability tool
(at least in part), such Monday-morning quarterbacking is, to some
extent, inevitable. At the same time, policy that provides officers with
some protection against arbitrary scrutiny may prove to be valuable
in incentivizing camera activation.

96. See Woodrow Hartzog, Body Cameras and the Path to Redeem Privacy Law, 96
N.C. L. REV. 1257, 1259–63 (2018).
97. Lum et al., supra note 57, at 138.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the officers we interviewed or surveyed within
these two departments held varying initial technological frames
regarding BWCs and the impact of BWCs on their discretion.
Perceptions of BWCs ranged from the impression that the cameras
were being used primarily (or solely) as a means to increase officer
accountability to those that emphasized the positive role BWCs can
play in the collection of evidence (including both for officers to use to
counter claims of misconduct as well as to support investigations).
Some officers also held the view that BWCs would provide a means
to show the public what real police work looked like (often dull,
routine, and boring or, at least, not filled with officers constantly
using force against suspects). A minority of officers agreed that
“always-on” activation policies were appropriate, generally due to
their concerns that selective recording would inevitably be held
against officers. In this sense, frequent activation was effectively seen
as a mechanism to preemptively shield officers against unjustified
criticism or unfounded claims of misconduct by supervisors, the
media, and the public.
In terms of activation, officers reported high rates of agreement
that certain types of calls warrant activation in most cases, particularly
during arrest situations, traffic stops, and domestic violence calls.
However, officers were somewhat less in favor of frequent recording
inside medical facilities or inside private homes. Over half of our
respondents reported that cameras should be activated during most or
all police-public interactions, and that BWCs were an appropriate
means to document witness or victim statements. Interestingly, our
respondents reported overall less frequent activation in practice
across contexts than their normative judgments would indicate,
perhaps indicating that they would not necessarily be averse to
stronger activation polices.
When
considering
the
tensions
between
activation,
accountability, transparency, and privacy, police agencies, and the
legislatures that regulate them, should seek to carefully consider a
balance between ex ante (policy) versus ex post (data management
and freedom of information) strategies. More research is needed to
examine how BWCs and activation policies affect officer and civilian
privacy and the willingness of witnesses and victims to talk, including
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in sensitive cases like domestic violence, sexual assault, death, inside
homes and medical facilities, and when officers are dealing with
confidential informants. Legislatures should be attuned to this
research as it emerges, and account for it in the ways they regulate
police use of BWCs and public access to BWC footage. Additionally,
future research is needed to shed more light on how the technological
frames that officers have of the cameras (and how these may change
over time) and how organizational considerations shape technology
use by officers, and how officers might choose to resist compliance or
use the technology in unexpected ways.
As the technological landscape surrounding BWCs continues to
evolve, so will the debate about camera activation. As mentioned
previously, technological triggers are slowly but surely finding their
way into newer versions of BWCs. It is tempting to think that this
would solve the issue of discretion altogether, as activation would
consequently cease to be a matter of discretion for officers but rather
for engineers and leadership who set the relevant activation
thresholds. However, these developments should by no means be
considered a panacea. At least for the foreseeable future,
technological triggers cannot replace human judgment in the
inherently complex situations officers are faced with on a day to day
basis. For example, cameras may inadvertently activate due to a loud
sound or the subsequent increased heartrate of an officer during a
highly sensitive conversation with an informant. Some degree of
camera control by officers will always need to be present. At the same
time, technological triggers hold significant promise—provided they
are implemented appropriately, taking full account of the context of
technological frames. We recommend, for example, that rather than
engineers or leadership setting the trigger thresholds, officers would
be allowed to set and tweak the triggers themselves (within certain
limits set by departmental policy). This helps reinforce the idea that
BWCs are useful tools that help them do their jobs, rather than tools
by which to exercise surveillance and scrutiny. Considering that many
officers spoke negatively of the need to manually activate the camera
and the resulting consequences for officer safety, it is likely they
would welcome such developments—if indeed framed correctly.
In a similar vein, developments in IT and computing are allowing
for more effective and efficient data management. “Recordeverything” strategies, when accompanied by strict and effective data-
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management systems, would eliminate the issue of activation while
simultaneously mitigating the resulting privacy harm. It remains,
however, a matter of trust between state and citizen and the
perception of the latter towards the former. Even when data
management policy is backed by legislation (through, for example,
strict limits on retention periods), it stands to reason that many
citizens would nevertheless object to being recorded on video. This is
particularly so for (possible) informants for whom anonymity is
especially key.
As it stands, activation policies need to be drafted to provide
officers clear and practical guidance, incentivize activation in
appropriate circumstances while allowing for some forms of
discretion, particularly in situations that implicate the legitimate
privacy-related concerns of bystanders, victims, witnesses, informants,
and suspects. Importantly, questions of public access to footage need
to be addressed to properly incentivize recording in some
circumstances where the potential for wide public visibility may push
against officers’ willingness to record due to privacy (or other)
concerns. Additionally, officers’ BWC activation (and attitudes
toward activation) should not only be seen as a consequence of their
fear of being held accountable for misconduct (e.g., due to the
98
“deterrence spectrum” )—rather, because the officers we studied
were also concerned with what and how their video would capture
useful evidence and portray their work to others, we should also focus
on how their “use of the technology . . . [might be] best understood as
consistent with the impressions [they] wish to convey to particular
99
audiences.” In this regard, individual officers have become part of,
and may have begun to internalize, the broader information politics
of the police to a greater extent due to the deployment of BWCs
within their agencies. BWCs have forced officers to constantly
balance and reconcile their (sometimes competing) interests in
impression management, documenting and collecting evidence, and
avoiding accountability for mistakes or malfeasance. To this end, it

98. See Ariel et al., supra note 21, at 14 (explaining that “[t]he deterrence spectrum
encapsulates the entire range of deterrence effects that an intervention . . . can have on
[certain behavior]”).
99. Manning, supra note 16, at 52.
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remains important to understand the technological and organizational
frames that officers have of BWCs and other related technologies,
100
of the
including “the assumptions, expectations and knowledge”
police, and additional research is needed, in a variety of settings and
contexts, so we can gain a broader and more generalizable
understanding of how BWCs are impacting the nature of police work
and the use of these and related surveillance technologies within
police departments. In the end, questions about appropriate
activation policies and practices are all about power, accountability,
and information politics. They cannot always be easily separated from
related questions about information access and control, meaning that
the appropriateness of any particular activation policy may depend in
large part on the local social, political, and legal context in which the
cameras are being deployed.

100. Orlikowski & Gash, supra note 9, at 178.

